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I. INTRODUCTION
Texas courts continue to examine franchise issues related to jurisdic-
tion, enforcement of contractual terms and arbitration provisions, bank-
ruptcy, common law and statutory claims, intellectual property, and
remedies. Cases during this Survey period address a range of pertinent
topics including Texas courts’ willingness to enforce arbitration provi-
sions, flexible standards for courts to grant parties relief from a default
judgment, the importance of creating a record for appeal, enforcement of
waiver-of-reliance provisions, and many other important developments.
This Survey’s selected cases and analyses will provide practitioners with
valuable insights into the current state of franchise law in Texas.
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Hyundai Motor America v. New World Car Nissan, Inc.,1 an auto-
mobile distributor (Hyundai) filed a petition for judicial review of an or-
der from the Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles
(TDMV). Licensed and franchised Hyundai dealers in the San Antonio
area filed a formal complaint against Hyundai with the TDMV alleging
that Hyundai violated multiple provisions under Chapter 2301 of the
Texas Occupations Code—namely, requiring the dealers to sell more ve-
hicles than Hyundai had allocated to the dealers as inventory.2 The
TDMV referred the formal complaint to the State Office of Administra-
tive Hearings for an adversarial hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).3 Following an opportunity for discovery and an evidentiary
hearing, the ALJ concluded that the dealers “failed to prove that Hy-
undai violated [any provisions of] the [Texas] Occupations Code.”4 The
Board of the TDMV rejected the ALJ’s conclusions, however, and issued
a final order overturning the ALJ’s findings—albeit without including
any “supporting rationale, fact findings, or legal conclusions.”5 The Board
ultimately granted Hyundai a rehearing, but still issued a final order de-
1. 581 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.).
2. Id. at 834.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 835.
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termining that Hyundai had violated Chapter 2301. Hyundai filed a peti-
tion for review in the 201st District Court of Travis County, but several
defendants removed the case to the Third Austin Court of Appeals
before any proceedings occurred in the district court.6
The sole jurisdictional issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals
had subject matter jurisdiction over any defendants other than the Board
of the TDMV, including the TDMV, the Chair of the Board of the
TDMV, and the Executive Director of the TDMV.7 The court noted that
the Texas Occupations Code authorized judicial review of “‘final ac-
tion[s] of the [Department’s] board’ in matters arising under Chapter
2301.”8 The term “board” is defined as the “nine-member governing
board of the [TDMV].”9 The TDMV is “a statutorily created state
agency” and “‘is composed of an executive director appointed by the
board and other employees required to efficiently implement’ applicable
laws[.]”10
The Occupations Code grants the Board “exclusive original jurisdiction
to regulate those aspects of the distribution, sale, or lease of motor vehi-
cles that are governed by [Chapter 2301.]”11 Chapter 2301 further speci-
fies that “[c]itation for an appeal [of an order of the Board] must be
served on the executive director or the executive director’s designee and
each party of record in the matter.”12 Citing a 2002 opinion from the
Texas Supreme Court for the holding that “in [a] suit for judicial review,
only [the] agency ‘whose ruling is to be appealed’ was [a] ‘proper defen-
dant to the district court proceeding’ when neither [the] APA nor [an]
enabling statute required service of citation on any other party[,]” the
court of appeals concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the TDMV and the Chair of the Board of the TDMV.13 Because the stat-
ute specified that the Board was the only entity with authority to issue
final orders, and because the statute directed notice of appeal to be
served on the Executive Director of the TDMV, those were the only
proper defendants in an action for judicial review of a Board final or-
der.14 Upon concluding that the TDMV and the Chair of the Board of the
TDMV were improper defendants and that the court lacked subject mat-




8. Id. (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.751(a) (citing Keystone RV Co. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 507 S.W.3d 829, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.))).
9. Id. (citing Keystone RV, 507 S.W.3d at 834–35).
10. Id. at 835–36 (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 1001.003 (citing TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. §§ 1001.002(a), (b)(3))).
11. Id. at 836 (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.151(a)).
12. Id. (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.752(b)).
13. Id. (quoting Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809,
813 (Tex. 2002)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 835.
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While this opinion involved a relatively uncomplicated analysis of the
limits of statutorily created subject matter jurisdiction, it addresses an is-
sue which could arise in any action for judicial review of administrative
orders. When bringing claims authorized by statute, it is always prudent
to consider jurisdictional limitations on the subject matter of a claim, in-
cluding proper parties.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
In Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Leonardo Worldwide Corp.,16 the
plaintiff (Elias) was a company specializing in syndicating hotel and re-
sort photographs. Elias alleged that it granted a limited license to make
use of various photographs (the Copyrighted Works) to Defendant Mar-
riott International, Inc. (Marriott), and that Marriott (among other de-
fendants) exceeded the scope of this license by distributing the
Copyrighted Works for display on third-party travel websites.17 Marriott
and its codefendants moved to dismiss Elias’s copyright claims for lack of
personal jurisdiction.18
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.19 The
court may review a range of evidence in determining whether the plaintiff
meets this burden, including “pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depo-
sitions, oral testimony, exhibits, any part of the record, and any combina-
tion thereof.”20 Any conflicting evidence must be resolved in favor of the
plaintiff.21 In this case, the plaintiff relied on the Texas long-arm statute
to assert that the district court had personal jurisdiction—either general
or specific—over Marriott, and specific jurisdiction over the remaining
defendants.22 Because the Texas long-arm statute “extends to the limits
of due process” the court was required to ensure that personal jurisdic-
tion over Marriott comported with the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.23
With regard to general personal jurisdiction—the court’s ability to as-
sert jurisdiction over claims which do not arise out of a defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum—the court noted that such jurisdiction attaches only
if the defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and sys-
tematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”24 In this
16. No. H-18-2142, 2019 WL 3713724 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019).
17. Id. at *1.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994)).
20. Id. (quoting Command-Aire Corp. v. Ontario Mech. Sales & Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d
90, 95 (5th Cir. 1992)).
21. Id. (citing Wilson, 20 F.3d at 648).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 220
(5th Cir. 2012)).
24. Id. (quoting Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Private Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011))).
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case, Elias argued that the court had general jurisdiction over Marriott—
despite the fact that Marriott is neither incorporated nor headquartered
in Texas—because Marriott owns, franchises, or licenses numerous
properties within Texas.25 The court disagreed, noting recent Supreme
Court precedent suggesting that it would be an “exceptional case” for a
corporation to be amenable to general jurisdiction in a forum which en-
compasses neither its state of incorporation nor its principal place of busi-
ness.26 While it was undisputed that Marriott operated, franchised, or
licensed 487 of its 6,700 worldwide properties in Texas—more than in any
other single state—the court was more persuaded by Marriott’s argu-
ments that (1) its 487 properties in Texas comprised only 7% of its global
total; (2) every single property in Texas was owned by third-party affili-
ates or subsidiaries; and (3) Marriott was only responsible for managing a
single property in Texas.27 Elias’s contrary evidence failed to show that
Marriott exercised a degree of control over any of its affiliates or subsidi-
aries sufficient for their conduct to be attributable to Marriott, and like-
wise failed to show that Marriott—incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in Maryland—engages in activities in Texas to a degree
indicating that it qualifies as an “exceptional case” under Daimler.28
Elias similarly failed to carry his burden to prove that his claim against
Marriott “arises out of or is related to [Marriott’s] contacts” with the fo-
rum state, as required for the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdic-
tion over Marriott.29 Elias contended simply that the court had specific
jurisdiction over all defendants, including Marriott, based on their in-
ternet presence.30 The fatal flaw in Elias’s argument was that, while the
court can exercise specific jurisdiction based on a defendant’s operation
of a website—applying the sliding-factor Zippo test based on the com-
mercial nature and interactivity of a given website—Elias’s claims in this
case arose from content displayed on third-party websites.31 While Marri-
ott’s website (www.marriott.com) was undoubtedly highly interactive,
Elias did not allege that any of the Copyrighted Works were improperly
displayed on that particular website.32 Therefore, the court concluded
that Elias’s claims “do not arise out of and are not related to Defendants’
Internet presence[,]” Elias failed to meet his burden of proving specific
jurisdiction, and the court lacked personal jurisdiction over all
defendants.33
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *1–3 (quoting Sangha, 882 F.3d at 101).
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id. at *2–3 (citing GreatFence.com, Inc. v. Bailey, 726 F. App’x 260, 261 (5th Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997))).
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id. (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
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Although the outcome of Victor Elias may have been different if the
plaintiff had pleaded and proved his jurisdictional facts more artfully, this
case demonstrates important nuances for personal jurisdiction in a digital
era, as well as the significance of corporate formalities when assessing
general jurisdiction.34 As evidence of the high bar for establishing general
personal jurisdiction over an entity which is neither incorporated nor
headquartered in the forum state, the district court was unmoved by evi-
dence of Marriott’s substantial economic interests in Texas in the form of
hundreds of properties owned and managed by franchisees, licensees, af-
filiates, and subsidiaries. Likewise, the court strictly construed the re-
quirement that a plaintiff’s claim “arise out of” the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state to exclude Marriott’s distribution of Copyrighted
Works to third parties for publication on third-party travel websites.
B. STANDING
In Amazing Lash Franchise, LLC v. Nguyen,35 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas granted a franchisee’s motion to dis-
miss a franchisor’s claims for statutory fraud, common law fraud, negli-
gent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy because the plaintiff lacked
standing to assert them.36 As factual background, Scott D. Nguyen—act-
ing through his wholly-owned corporation, Hawthorne Heights, LLC—
purchased several “Amazing Lash” studios from Amazing Lash Studio
Franchise, LLC (ALSF) in October 2017, with separate transfer agree-
ments and franchise agreements executed in early November 2017.37 In
June 2018, Amazing Lash Franchise, LLC (Plaintiff) “was incorporated in
34. For a more in-depth personal jurisdiction analysis involving complex corporate en-
tities, see Diece-Lisa Indus. v. Disney Enters., 943 F.3d 239, 250 (5th Cir. 2019). While
Diece-Lisa did not involve franchisees per se, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit discussed the so-called “franchise theory” and “licensor theory” for attributing the
forum contacts of subsidiaries—in that case, Disney’s retail entities—to the parent entity.
Id. at 250–51. The Fifth Circuit described the “franchise theory” as arguing that the entire
parent corporation “should be treated as one franchise for purposes of personal jurisdic-
tion[,]” extending the court’s personal jurisdiction over in-state subsidiaries to nonresident
corporations. Id. The “licensor theory” is somewhat more targeted and proposes that per-
sonal jurisdiction over in-state licensees extends to nonresident licensors of allegedly-in-
fringing content. Id. at 251. While the Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that the
relationships between resident and non-resident Disney entities were insufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction under either theory, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the “institutional
independence” of subsidiaries and affiliates is relevant to similar jurisdictional analysis in-
volving franchises. Id. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit’s blunt rejection of non-exclusive licenses
to resident third parties as the basis for personal jurisdiction is instructive. Id. at 253
(“Neither this nor any other circuit has held that specific jurisdiction may arise solely from
a defendant licensor’s non-exclusive licenses to third parties who sell allegedly infringing
products in the forum state, and at least one circuit has explicitly rejected such a theory.”)
(collecting cases).
35. No. H-18-4671, 2019 WL 3302580 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2019).
36. Id. at *1.
37. Scott D. Nguyen, Hawthorne Heights, LLC, and the LLCs for each of Nguyen’s
“Amazing Lash” studios (2621 Amazing River Oaks, LLC, 1923 Amazing Sawyer Heights,
LLC, 1415 Amazing Voss, LLC, 9650 Amazing Woodlake, LLC, 10927 Amazing Vintage
Park, LLC, 6501 Amazing Grand Lakes Katy, LLC) are hereafter referred to, collectively,
as the Franchisee Defendants.
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. . . Delaware.”38 “In September 2018, Plaintiff acquired the ‘Amazing
Lash’ franchise system” and all of its existing franchise agreements from
ALSF.39 Plaintiff subsequently sued Franchisee Defendants for failing to
comply with their obligations under the various franchise agreements,
and Franchisee Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud-based
claims on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing to assert fraud because
Plaintiff was not in existence at the time the franchise agreements were
executed.40
The district court began its analysis by noting that a basic “requirement
of constitutional standing is that the plaintiff must have suffered (or be
imminently threatened with suffering) the alleged injury[,]” and adding
that the burden to prove standing lies with the party invoking federal
jurisdiction.41 While Texas law generally recognizes that assignees have
standing to assert claims assigned to them, there is an exception for fraud-
based claims, which are “personal to the defrauded party.”42 As a result,
“[a]n assignee of a contract that was not a party to the fraudulent transac-
tion does not have standing to sue unless he was ‘specifically assigned
causes of action for fraud. . . .’”43 As applied to the facts of this case,
Plaintiff did not exist at the time of alleged misrepresentations made by
Defendant Franchisees to Plaintiff’s assignor, ALSF.44 Furthermore, al-
though an Asset Purchase Agreement assigned all “claims or causes of
action” of ALSF to an intermediate assignor entity (Wellness and Vitality
Exchange, LLC, or WAVE), which in turn assigned its “right, title, and
interest” to Plaintiff, neither assignment specifically assigned ALSF’s
fraud-based claims, which remained personal to ALSF.45 Therefore, be-
cause Plaintiff was never specifically assigned the rights to pursue ALSF’s
fraud-based claims against the Franchisee Defendants, Plaintiff lacked
standing to assert claims for statutory fraud, common law fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, and the court dismissed all such
claims.46
Though brief, this opinion illustrates a unique and important exception
to the general rule that legal rights may be assigned using the ubiquitous
“claims or causes of action” catchall. Given the frequency with which
franchise relationships involve assignments, as well as the popularity of
38. Amazing Lash, 2019 WL 3302580, at *1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Pelletier v. Victoria Air Conditioning, Ltd., 780 F. App’x 136, 139 (5th
Cir. 2019)).
42. Id. at *2 (quoting Baker v. City of Robinson, 305 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2009, pet. denied) (quoting Vial v. Gas Sols., Ltd., 187 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. denied)).
43. Id. (quoting In re JNS Aviation, LLC, 376 B.R. 500, 533–34 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2007), aff’d sub nom. JNS Aviation, Inc. v. Nick Corp., 418 B.R. 898 (N.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d
sub nom. JNS Aviation, Inc. v. Nick Corp. (In re JNS Aviation, L.L.C.), 395 F. App’x 127
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fraud-based claims in franchise litigation, both plaintiffs and defendants
would be well-served to consider standing to bring fraud-based claims at
the inception of franchise litigation.
C. EXPERT WITNESSES
ProTradeNet, LLC v. Predictive Profiles, Inc.47 involved a Daubert rul-
ing on the admissibility of an expert witness’s testimony on damages in-
curred by the plaintiff (PTN) due to alleged trademark infringement by
the defendant (Predictive). As background, PTN is a subsidiary of Dwyer
Franchising, LLC (Dwyer), and PTN and Dwyer provide services de-
signed to help independently owned and operated franchised businesses
source competitively-priced goods and services.48 Specifically, PTN
researches vendors of a variety of goods and services, and selects “Pre-
ferred Vendors” to market to franchisees.49 In this case, PTN selected
Predictive as a Preferred Vendor of employee recruiting services, and the
two parties entered into a non-exclusive agreement in February 2017.50
The agreement was terminated in 2018, and PTN subsequently sued for
trademark infringement, alleging that Predictive continued to use the
Dwyer marks after the termination of the agreement and after receiving a
cease and desist letter from PTN.51
In proving its trademark claims, PTN sought to introduce the expert
testimony of Dr. Charles M. North (Dr. North) on PTN’s damages. Pre-
dictive argued that the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, acting as an evidentiary “gatekeeper” under Daubert and its prog-
eny, should exclude Dr. North’s testimony as insufficiently reliable under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.52 The district court summarized its role as
the following,:“[p]ursuant to these rules, ‘a district court may exclude evi-
dence that is based upon unreliable principles or methods, legally insuffi-
cient facts and data, or where the reasoning or methodology is not
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.’”53 Predictive specifically argued
that Dr. North’s testimony concerning Dwyer’s unaudited financial
47. No. 6:18-CV-00038-ADA, 2019 WL 6499488 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2019).




52. Id. at *3; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert I), 509 U.S. 579
(1993). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that
[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b)
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
53. ProTradeNet, 2019 WL 6499488, at *3 (quoting Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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records of advertising expenses and Dr. North’s investigation of individ-
ual advertising transactions rendered his testimony unreliable.
The court ultimately concluded that Dr. North’s analysis of trademark
damages was sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702.54 The
court recited the “general rule” that issues with the “bases and sources of
an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned to that opinion rather
than its admissibility” noting that it is the role of the trier of fact to weigh
the persuasiveness of evidence.55 The exception to this general rule ap-
plies only where an expert’s testimony “is so fundamentally unsupported
that it cannot possibly help the fact finder.”56 In this case, the court found
that Dr. North’s analysis was “more than sufficient to pass muster under
Daubert” and added that Predictive would have “ample opportunity to
vigorously cross examine Dr. North” in an upcoming bench trial.57 As
factors weighing decisively in favor of admissibility under Rule 702, the
court noted that: (1) Dr. North adequately revealed his methodology in
his expert report; (2) Dr. North discussed relevant portions of the Lan-
ham Act; (3) Dr. North “identified the buckets of damages” that PTN
sought to recover; (4) Dr. North addressed “methodologies that have pre-
viously been blessed by courts”; and (5) Dr. North considered relevant
expenses and used them to estimate a discount of the potential damages
amount.58 Having concluded that Dr. North’s expert opinion was suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted, the court denied Predictive’s motion to
exclude Dr. North’s testimony.59
While this case generally conforms to well-established and permissive
guidelines for the admissibility of expert damages testimony, it is illustra-
tive of Daubert analysis in the context of trademark infringement with
some relevance to franchise law; while there was no franchise relationship
implicated in the case, the damages testimony—particularly regarding
corrective advertising—would be applicable in a typical franchise trade-
mark dispute.
D. ARBITRATION
Arbitration provisions continued to see support from Texas courts this
Survey period. In Dickey’s Barbecue Restaurants, Inc. v. Campbell Invest-
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (empha-
sis added)).
56. Id. (citing Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422).
57. Id. at *3–4.
58. Id. at *4 (specifically mentioning that courts have determined the “FTC 25%
Rule” to be a “proper methodology for assessing damages for corrective advertising” in-
cluding pretrial corrective advertising); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 346 F.
Supp. 3d 951, 959–60 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (citing multiple cases to support its conclusion that
25% of total advertising expenditures was a fair award to compensate the plaintiff for
corrective advertising undertaken to mitigate damages caused by defendant’s Lanham Act
violations).
59. ProTradeNet, 2019 WL 6499488, at *4.
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ments, LLC,60 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
adopted the magistrate judge’s conclusions and submitted the parties’ dis-
putes to arbitration despite objections raised by Dickey’s, the franchisor,
and the franchisee.61
In 2014, Dickey’s, and Kody and Kevin Campbell (the Campbells) en-
tered into a development agreement to open two Dickey’s restaurants in
Utah.62 The development agreement contained a broad arbitration
provision:
[T]he parties agree to submit all disputes, controversies, claims,
causes of action and/or alleged breaches or failures to perform aris-
ing out of or relating to [the Development] Agreement . . . or the
relationship created by [the Development] Agreement . . . to non-
binding mediation . . . . [A]ll Disputes which shall not be resolved
through mediation . . . shall be submitted for binding arbitration . . . .63
Shortly after signing the development agreement, the Campbells ac-
quired an existing Dickey’s franchise in South Jordan, Utah, which they
operated for two years before closing.64 The Campbells did not open any
additional locations in Utah and, after receiving a notice of default and
termination from Dickey’s, the Campbells and their investment entity
filed suit against Dickey’s concerning their franchise relationship.65
Dickey’s moved to compel arbitration of the dispute, but the Utah district
court refused.66 Dickey’s appealed the Utah court’s decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and separately filed a demand for
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) alleging
breach of the development agreement and the South Jordan franchise
agreement.67 The Campbells responded by informing the AAA of the
pending Utah litigation and sought to halt the arbitration.68 After the
AAA agreed to halt the arbitration until either (1) the parties agreed to
proceed with arbitration; or (2) “the AAA receive[d] a final order of a
court . . . provid[ing] that the case [should] proceed [to] arbitration[,]” the
Campbells dismissed the Utah litigation with prejudice.69
Dickey’s filed a petition to compel arbitration in the Eastern District of
Texas.70 The Campbells pursued three objections based on the prior Utah
litigation: (1) Dickey’s was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the is-
sue of arbitrability; (2) res judicata prevented Dickey’s from raising the
arbitration clause in this case; and (3) Dickey’s waived its right to arbitra-
60. No. 4:18-CV-00491-ALM-KPJ, 2019 WL 1219118 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2019).
61. Id. at *1.
62. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc. v. Campbell Invs., LLC, No. 4:18-CV-491-ALM-
KPJ, 2019 WL 2301367, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2019).
63. Id. at *1.






70. Id. at *3.
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tion by not raising it in the Utah litigation.71 The district court disagreed
on all points.72 The court overruled the objections because the terms of
the agreement were never fully litigated in the Utah litigation, there was
no final judgment in the other action, and Dickey’s consistently took the
position that the disputes should be submitted to arbitration.73 Both par-
ties objected to the magistrate’s report because it did not specify which
claims should be arbitrated, but the court simply granted Dickey’s motion
to compel arbitration of disputes arising out of the development agree-
ment and denied Dickey’s motion with respect to disputes arising from
the franchise agreements or any other claims which formed the basis of
the Utah litigation.74
Whereas Dickey’s addressed the enforceability of an arbitration provi-
sion, Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Onkar Lodging, Inc.75 concerned
the enforceability of an arbitral award. In Onkar Lodging, Choice Hotels
arbitrated a franchise agreement dispute with Onkar Lodging, Inc.,
Harbhajan Nahal, and Maljinder Singh (collectively, Onkar). The arbitra-
tion was administered by a panel of AAA arbitrators in Maryland.76 That
“AAA panel [ultimately] denied Onkar’s claims and awarded Choice
[Hotels] costs and [attorney’s] fees.”77 Subsequently, both parties con-
tested the award in the 202nd District Court in Bowie County, Texas,
with Choice Hotels seeking to confirm and enforce the arbitral award and
Onkar seeking to invalidate and vacate the award.78 On September 13,
2018, the district court denied the motion by Choice Hotels to confirm
the award and ordered all parties to arbitrate through JAMS—a different
“private alternative dispute resolution provider.”79 Choice Hotels ap-
pealed the district court’s denial and order, arguing that the district court
erred in (1) denying Choice Hotels’s motion to confirm the arbitration;
and (2) in ordering a new arbitration with a different arbitration
provider.80
While the factual background of this franchise dispute and the merits
of the underlying dispute are complex and noteworthy in-and-of them-
selves, the primary significance of the opinion by the Sixth Texarkana
Court of Appeals is its analysis of the grounds for vacating an arbitral
award, as well as the more general issue of whether the arbitration provi-
sion was binding in the first place.
71. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc. v. Campbell Invs., LLC, No. 4:18-CV-00491-ALM-
KPJ, 2019 WL 1219118, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2019).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2–3.
75. No. 06-18-00074-CV, 2019 WL 2363316 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 5, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.).





134 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
Regarding grounds for vacatur, the court of appeals began by noting
that, under applicable Maryland law, an arbitration provision in a con-
tract confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the arbitration provision
and enter a judgment enforcing the arbitration award.81 The decision of a
court to grant or deny a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award
is a conclusion of law which appellate courts review without deference.82
Maryland policy considerations favor arbitration as an efficient and effec-
tive alternative to litigation. The benefits outweigh the downside of “very
narrowly limited” judicial review of arbitration awards, with courts gener-
ally deferring to arbitrators’ findings of fact and conclusions of law;
“[m]ere errors of law and fact do not ordinarily furnish grounds for a
court to vacate . . . an arbitration award.”83 More specifically, the Mary-
land Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA) expressly provides “that a court
may not vacate an award, or refuse to confirm an award, ‘on the ground
that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same
relief.’”84
MUAA also provides five specific instances in which a court “shall”
vacate an arbitral award, but the basis specifically relevant to Onkar’s
argument was that the “arbitrators exceeded their powers” by re-drafting
the franchise agreement, failing to apply Maryland law, and manifestly
disregarding the law.85 The concept of an arbitration panel’s “powers”
under the MUAA has been interpreted by Maryland appellate courts as a
kind of jurisdiction, distinguishing the issues of whether the panel acted
within its authority under the applicable arbitration agreement, and
whether the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law in resolving the
dispute.86
Regarding the quasi-jurisdictional component of arbitral “powers,” the
court concluded that the AAA panel was well within its authority to con-
strue the parties’ franchise agreement; while Onkar obviously disagreed
with the panel’s interpretation of the terms of the franchise agreement
and conclusion that Choice Hotels did not breach the agreement, the de-
cisive issue was simply whether “the arbitrator (even arguably) inter-
preted the parties’ contract, not whether he got its meaning right or
wrong.”87 The AAA panel likewise did not exceed its “powers” by failing
to apply Maryland law on proximate causation. Because the panel con-
cluded that Choice Hotels did not breach the agreement in the first place,
any discussion of damages models or causation was mere dicta.88 The
court likewise rejected Onkar’s final basis for vacatur, concluding that the
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id. (citing WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Assocs., 190 A.3d 255, 260 (Md. 2018)).
83. Id. (quoting Downey v. Sharp, 51 A.3d 573, 583 (Md. 2012)).
84. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-224(c)).
85. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-224(b)(3)).
86. Id. at *6 (citing Prince George’s Cty. Police Civilian Emps. Ass’n v. Prince
George’s Cty. ex rel. Prince George’s Cty. Police Dep’t, 135 A.3d 347, 356 (Md. 2016)).
87. Id. at *9 (quoting Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 (2013)).
88. Id. at *10.
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arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law.89 This last basis is an
especially steep burden for the party attempting to vacate an arbitral
award. While there is no bright line rule, the standard for vacatur enunci-
ated by Maryland appellate courts requires “reasoning so palpably faulty
that no judge, or groups of judges, could ever conceivably make such a
ruling[.]”90 The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that no such
error existed in this case.91
Finally, the court of appeals held that, under Maryland law, the arbitra-
tion agreement was enforceable. The court began by acknowledging the
general legal principle that arbitration agreements—like all contracts—
are susceptible to invalidation for fraud, duress, unconscionability, and
other common defenses to the enforcement of contracts.92 None of those
common defenses applied in this case. Notwithstanding Onkar’s argu-
ment that the arbitration provision of its franchise agreement is illusory
because Choice Hotels receives favorable treatment from arbitrators, the
court held that sufficient consideration existed for the contract to be en-
forceable. Simply put, “because Choice [Hotels] was bound to arbitrate
under the agreement, its promise to arbitrate was not illusory.”93 Like-
wise, despite Onkar’s complaints of arbitrator bias in favor of Choice Ho-
tels, evidence of such bias did not rise to the level of substantive and
procedural unconscionability, as required by several Maryland courts
before rendering an arbitration agreement unenforceable.94 Specifically,
Onkar’s support for its arguments—that the arbitration was required to
take place at Choice Hotel’s headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, and
that Choice Hotels used its relative size as leverage to select more
favorable arbitrators and secure more favorable awards—fails to explain
how the specific forum was unfair or unreasonable.95 Finally, Onkar
failed to prove that the arbitration agreement was obtained by fraud.
Whereas Onkar argued that Choice Hotels fraudulently induced Onkar
to agree to the arbitration agreement by omitting details about the arbi-
tral process—such as the location and procedure for selecting arbitra-
tors—the court of appeals reasoned that such omissions were not
material misrepresentations, but that Choice Hotels had no duty to dis-
close such information in an arms-length transaction.96 Thus, the arbitra-
tion agreement was enforceable, and the court of appeals reversed the
89. Id. (explaining that the “Maryland Court of Appeals determined that a court may
vacate an arbitrator’s decision for manifest disregard of applicable law even though that
ground is not listed as a statutory ground for vacatur.”).
90. Id. (quoting WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Assocs., 190 A.3d 255, 266 (Md.
2018)).
91. Id. at *11.
92. Id. (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
93. Id. at *12.
94. Id. (citing Raglani v. Ripken Prof’l Baseball, 939 F. Supp. 2d 517, 523 (D. Md.
2013)).
95. Id. at *13–15 (adding that “Onkar had the opportunity to conduct its due diligence
before the arbitration and to raise the concerns it now raises, but evidently failed to do
so.”).
96. Id. at *15.
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district court’s judgment denying confirmation of the arbitral award and
ordering JAMS arbitration, and instead rendered judgment confirming
the award.97
Taken together, these cases demonstrate the strong policy prefer-
ences—in Texas and elsewhere—favoring the enforceability of arbitration
provisions as well as the confirmation of arbitral awards, except in certain
limited circumstances.
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Pecos Inn, LLC,98 the plaintiff
(Choice Hotels) filed a trademark infringement suit against franchisee
defendants (Pecos), with defendants being served on March 30, 2018. On
April 30, 2018, Pecos had not answered the complaint and Choice Hotels
moved for entry of default judgment which the clerk of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas, Pecos Division, filed.99 Choice
Hotels moved for default judgment on September 11, 2018.100 Pecos
eventually filed an answer on June 3, 2019, and then filed a motion to set
aside the entry of default.101
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs default judg-
ments. Rule 55(c) permits a court to set aside an entry of default judg-
ment “for good cause.”102 While the decision to set aside a default
judgment “lies within the sound discretion of the district court[,]” defaults
are generally disfavored and are not intended to be enforced strictly
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.103 The most relevant consid-
erations for a court when deciding whether to set aside a default judg-
ment are determining (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether
setting aside the default judgment would prejudice the opposing party;
and (3) whether the party seeking the set-aside has a meritorious defense
to the underlying claims.104
As applied to the facts of Pecos, the district court was persuaded on the
first element by the fact that Pecos was a family-run business, and that the
sole member of Pecos Inn, LLC—Ram Kunwar—possessed “minimal
ability to read and write English” and relied heavily on his wife and chil-
dren to understand legal communications.105 Following the death of
Kunwar’s wife in 2015, his daughter began managing his hotel’s opera-
tions, but she left abruptly in late 2018 due to complications with the ho-
97. Id. at *16.
98. No. PE:18-CV-9-DC, 2019 WL 5417154 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2019).
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c)).
103. Id. (citing United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 763 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Effjohn Int’l Cruise Holdings, Inc. v. A&L Sales, Inc., 346 F.3d 552, 563
(5th Cir. 2003))).
104. Id. (citing In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521,
544–45 (5th Cir. 2014)).
105. Id. at *2.
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tel’s operations and finances.106 It was only after Kunwar’s son, Rahul,
took over the business that he first learned of the lawsuit and understood
the need to respond. Despite conceding that Ram Kunwar was aware of
the lawsuit at the time the complaint was filed, his inability to communi-
cate prevented him from understanding the need to file an answer,
prompting the court to conclude “that the default was due to excusable
neglect and was not willful.”107 The court likewise concluded that setting
aside the default would pose no prejudice to Choice Hotels—largely be-
cause Choice Hotels omitted to address that element in its opposition to
Pecos’s motion to set aside the default, but also because “mere delay does
not alone constitute prejudice.”108 Finally, the court held that Pecos could
raise a “defense of sufficient merit to raise the possibility of a change of
outcome” in response to Choice Hotels’s trademark-related claims, be-
cause Pecos asserted that it de-identified following demands from Choice
Hotels as early as May 2017, and was not profitable following the termi-
nation of its franchise agreement.109 Thus, having found a basis to set
aside the judgment on all three requisite elements, the district court
granted Pecos’s motion to set aside the default judgment.110
This case demonstrates the flexible standards for courts to grant parties
relief from a default judgment. In contrast to much harsher outcomes
where parties fail to vigorously litigate claims and defenses in an adver-
sary proceeding—as will be discussed in Morrison and Opps—judicial
policy favoring a full and fair hearing weighs decisively against the resolu-
tion of litigation by a default judgment. Indeed, a fundamental premise of
the adversarial system in common law is that self-interested parties, advo-
cating ardently on their own behalf, provide the most thorough and trans-
parent mechanism for resolving legal disputes. A default judgment
undermines this premise by terminating a proceeding without any regard
for the merits and is thus heavily disfavored.
F. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Morrison v. Profanchik,111 appellants appealed a take-nothing sum-
mary judgment grant in favor of Profanchik on appellants’ claims related
to Profanchik’s alleged breach of a nondisclosure agreement, his alleged
interference with appellants’ nondisclosure agreements with third parties,
and his misappropriation of trade secrets.112 The parties were no stran-
gers at the time of this appeal, as their competing limestone veneer com-
panies had previously been involved in at least four lawsuits.113 This
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Id. (quoting Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000)).
109. Id. at *3–4.
110. Id. at *4.
111. No. 05-17-01281-CV, 2019 WL 3798182 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 13, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.), supplemented, No. 05-17-01281-CV, 2019 WL 5112268 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct.
10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id.
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particular dispute originated as a counterclaim by appellants in response
to a lawsuit by Profanchik.114 Profanchik had, at one point, expressed
interest in purchasing a franchise from appellants, and the parties exe-
cuted a nondisclosure/noncompete agreement to facilitate the prospective
franchise deal.115 Profanchik alleged that soon after signing the agree-
ment, he discovered that appellants had made misrepresentations,
prompting him to abandon the franchise purchase and start his own com-
peting limestone veneer company.116 Profanchik subsequently sued ap-
pellants and appellants counterclaimed for breach and interference with
various nondisclosure/noncompete agreements.117 In response to these
counterclaims, Profanchik filed both traditional and no-evidence motions
for summary judgment on appellants’ counterclaims, and appellants like-
wise moved for summary judgment on Profanchik’s claims against
them.118 The 416th District Court in Collin County, Texas, granted
Profanchik’s motions and denied appellants’ motion, and a jury subse-
quently returned a take-nothing verdict in favor of Profanchik.119
On appeal, the appellants only sought to contest the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment for Profanchik on appellants’ claims for breach of
contract, tortious interference, and misappropriation of trade secrets.120
The trial court’s grant of Profanchik’s traditional summary judgment mo-
tion was reviewed de novo, under the ubiquitous legal standard that sum-
mary judgment may only be granted if “there is no genuine issue of
material fact and [the movant] is entitled to summary judgment as a mat-
ter of law.”121 No-evidence motions for summary judgment are reviewed
under the same sufficiency-of-evidence standard as directed verdicts.122
Where, as in this case, the trial court did not specify whether it granted
the motion for summary judgment on traditional or no-evidence grounds,
appellants are required to “negate all possible grounds upon which the
order could have been based.”123 To prevail on a motion for summary
judgment on traditional or no-evidence grounds, the non-movant must
show “more than a scintilla of evidence to support each challenged ele-
ment of its claims” with “every reasonable inference” and “any doubts”
resolved in the nonmovant’s favor.124
Regarding appellant’s claims for tortious interference, appellants failed
outright to challenge each possible ground for the trial court’s grant of





118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)).
122. Id. (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)).
123. Id. (citing Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,
pet. denied)).
124. Id. (citing Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248) (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)).
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lants failed to challenge all possible grounds supporting the grant of sum-
mary judgment, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals “must accept the
validity of the unchallenged grounds and affirm the adverse ruling.”125
Likewise, because the unchallenged grounds provided an independent
basis for affirming the grant of summary judgment by the trial court, any
further error by the trial court is—by definition—harmless, rendering the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the tortious interference
claim irreversible.126
Appellants’ arguments concerning their claim for breach of contract
were similarly ill-fated. Not only did appellants fail to explain how
Profanchik breached the nondisclosure/noncompete agreement, but ap-
pellants failed to cite to a single piece of evidence in the summary judg-
ment record at any point in the argument section of their appellate
brief.127 Instead, appellants relied exclusively on several paragraphs from
one appellant’s affidavit, which did “little more than broadly state that
Profanchik is using [appellants’] confidential and proprietary information
to compete with [appellants’ business].”128 While the affidavit referenced
additional documents which appellants asserted include their intellectual
property, the court of appeals concluded that the referenced state-
ments—the sole evidence appellants cited in support of their breach of
contract claim—were conclusory and therefore “not proper summary
judgment evidence to be considered on appeal.”129 Because appellants
failed to present any cognizable evidence to support their claim for
breach of the nondisclosure/noncompete agreement, appellants’ remain-
ing arguments concerning the enforceability of the agreement were
irrelevant.130
Appellants’ final argument concerning their trade secrets claim failed
miserably as well. Despite devoting five pages of their appellate brief in
support of their argument that “there is no question that the summary
judgment record contains disputed facts regarding trade secrets of [appel-
lants,]” the appellants failed to provide a single citation to evidence in the
summary judgment record.131 Appellants failed to address Profanchik’s
no-evidence summary judgment arguments, providing yet another inde-
pendent basis for the court of appeals to affirm the trial court’s grant of
Profanchik’s summary judgment motion.132 With the final point of error
summarily resolved, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judg-
ment in favor of Profanchik.133
As acknowledged by the court in issuing its memorandum opinion, the
125. Id. at *3 (citing Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *4.
129. Id. (citing Ryland Grp., Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *5.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *6.
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Morrison appeal involved issues which “are well-settled in law.”134 Texas
appellate courts have no duty to do appellants’ work for them by scouring
the summary judgment record for evidence supporting appellants’ argu-
ments.135 Where appellants fail to challenge each ground on which sum-
mary judgment could have been granted, Texas appellate courts are
required to affirm the judgment.136 As in Opp, Morrison is a reminder of
the importance of participating actively in both trial court and appellate
proceedings. Had the Morrison appellants put more effort into contesting
Profanchik’s summary judgment motions, they would not have had such
an inadequate summary judgment record on appeal.
G. RECORD ON APPEAL
In Opp v. Rainbow International, LLC,137 Jason and Jennifer Opp (the
Opps) entered into a franchise agreement with the appellee (Rainbow) in
April 2014. Between November 2016 and early 2017, Rainbow alleged
that the Opps committed numerous breaches of the franchise agreement,
such as failing to pay various fees, failing to make payments on their
promissory note, bouncing checks, and failing to submit required sales
reports.138 On March 9, 2018, Rainbow filed suit in the 414th District
Court in McLennan County, Texas, alleging various breach of contract
claims.139 The Opps filed two motions to transfer venue to federal court
in Alaska—where they reside—but neither motion was included in the
record on appeal and there is no record that hearings were conducted on
the Opps’ motions.140 The Opps likewise alleged that they filed a motion
to continue the bench trial scheduled for October 18, 2018, but that mo-
tion was also not included in the record on appeal.141 The trial court ulti-
mately conducted a bench trial on October 18, 2018.142 The Opps failed
to attend the bench trial, and judgment was subsequently rendered for
Rainbow in the amounts of $189,686.08 in damages and another
$40,200.00 in attorney’s fees.143
On January 18, 2019, the Opps filed a pro se notice of restricted ap-
peal.144 A restricted appeal is “a direct attack on the [trial court’s] judg-
ment[,]” and requires the party attacking the judgment to show that: (1)
“it filed notice of . . . restricted appeal within six months” of the judg-
134. Id. at *1 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4).
135. Id. at *5 (citing King v. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A., 205 S.W.3d 731, 734–35 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)).
136. Id. (first citing Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970); then
citing St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 547 S.W.3d 311, 314–15 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2018), rev’d, 595 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam)).
137. No. 10-19-00022-CV, 2019 WL 5800449 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 6, 2019, no pet.
h.).
138. Id. at *1.
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ment; (2) “it was a party to the underlying lawsuit”; (3) “it did not partici-
pate in the hearing” from which the judgment resulted “and did not
timely file any post-judgment motions”; and (4) “error is apparent on the
face of the record.”145 The only element at issue in the Opps’ appeal was
whether error was apparent on the face of the record.146 Crucially, a re-
stricted appeal requires that evidence of such error be apparent from the
record on appeal, rather than error inferred from other sources.147 In this
case, the Opps bore the burden of including their motions to transfer
venue and motion for continuance in the record on appeal. Without this
documentation, the Tenth Waco Court of Appeals had no way to deter-
mine whether error was “apparent on the face of the record.”148 Accord-
ingly, the Opps’ issues on appeal involving those filings were
overruled.149
The Opps likewise contended that the trial court erred in declining to
hear their motion to transfer venue.150 The legal authority that the Opps
cited to support this point of error, however, applied only to Texas justice
courts—not the district court that rendered the judgment.151 Once again,
the lack of any evidence in the appellate record—that the Opps re-
quested a setting on their motion to transfer venue to federal court in
Alaska—was fatal to their argument on appeal.152
This case serves as a cautionary tale of the importance of participating
earnestly and early in trial court proceedings, and diligently assembling
the record on any appeal. The Opps not only failed to offer a meaningful
defense at trial, but failed to preserve any opportunity for a retrial by
omitting filings in the appellate record which were necessary for their
arguments on appeal. As evidenced by the court of appeals’ court opinion
overruling every single issue raised by the Opps, Texas appellate courts
are bound to strictly construe the required elements of a restricted appeal
notwithstanding the pro se status of the appellants.
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION AND
NON-RENEWAL
A. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
This Survey period revealed an interesting case involving franchise re-
newal terms. In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday,153 a side letter agreement
extending the term of the two area development agreements with devel-
145. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004)); see
also TEX. R. APP. P. 30.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. 2004)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at *2–3.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 87 (noting that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 pro-
vides that the “movant has the duty to request a setting on a motion to transfer.”)).
152. Id.
153. No. 3:18-CV-0221-N, 2019 WL 499105 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2019) (mem. op.).
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oper Clairday made it difficult for Pizza Inn to deny a second renewal
term at the expiration of the first extension.154 In that case, the original
term of the development agreements between the parties lasted twenty
years with the option of two five-year renewal terms.155 At the expiration
of the initial twenty-year term, the parties entered a side agreement ex-
tending the term by five years.156 At the expiration of the first renewal
term, Clairday demanded a second renewal option by delivering notice of
renewal to Pizza Inn, albeit two months late.157 Pizza Inn sued Clairday
seeking a declaratory judgment that the development agreements expired
by their terms.158 Pizza Inn moved for summary judgment but the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas declined to grant it.159
Specifically, the court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment.
Even though the side agreement explicitly provided consent to a single
renewal term, it did not clearly negate the possibility of a second.160 The
court also pointed out Clairday suffered financial loss with the closing of
the franchise and equity favored Clairday despite Clairday’s delay be-
cause, when compared to a twenty-year term and five-year renewal term,
two months delay was slight.161 This case demonstrates the importance of
clearly outlining the terms (and limitations) in side agreements when the




In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,162 the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered the issue of whether a debtor’s rejection of a
trademark licensing agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding terminates
the licensee’s rights to continue using the trademarks.163 Tempnology
granted Mission Product Holdings (Mission) an exclusive license to dis-
tribute Tempnology’s products, as well as a non-exclusive license for Mis-
sion to use Tempnology’s “Coolcore” trademarks.164 Though the
licensing agreement was not set to expire until July 2016, Tempnology
filed for bankruptcy in September 2015, and subsequently sought to reject
its licensing agreement with Mission under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code.165 Under Section 365, a debtor is permitted to reject any executory
154. Id. at *1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id.
162. 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
163. Id. at 1657.
164. Id. at 1658.
165. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018)).
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contract—a contract still being performed—but the section clarifies that a
debtor’s rejection of a contract constitutes a breach.166 While neither
party contested that Mission had a claim against the bankruptcy estate for
damages resulting from the breach—an unsecured claim for which Mis-
sion may only receive a fraction of its damages—Tempnology sought de-
claratory judgment that Mission’s rights to continue using Tempnology’s
trademarks were terminated by Tempnology’s rejection of the licensing
agreement.167
At the heart of the dispute were two analogies. According to one view,
rejection of a contract under Section 365 was like any other breach of
contract. It gave the non-breaching party (Mission) a claim for damages
while preserving the non-breaching party’s other rights under the con-
tract.168 According to the other view, a Section 365 rejection is like a
rescission of a contract in a non-bankruptcy context—allowing the non-
rescinding party (Mission) to seek damages, but also terminating “the
whole agreement along with all rights it conferred.”169 The Supreme
Court ultimately held that the former interpretation—that rejection was
like breach—was more consistent with the text of Section 365 and
broader principles of contract under the common law and the Bankruptcy
Code.170 Noting the “general bankruptcy rule” that the bankruptcy “es-
tate cannot possess anything more than the debtor itself[,]” the Court
reasoned that Tempnology conveyed the right to use its marks to Mission
prior to the bankruptcy, and necessarily lost the right to prevent Mission
from using the marks for the duration of the license agreement.171 Be-
cause Tempnology had no right to prevent Mission from using its marks
at the time Tempnology declared bankruptcy, the bankruptcy estate had
no basis to assert that right.172 The Court rejected Tempnology’s attempts
to distinguish the unique nature of trademarks and other intellectual
property from more general contracts; while the Court agreed that con-
tinued use of the marks following rejection of the licensing agreement
could diminish the value to Tempnology’s marks, and further agreed that
the Bankruptcy Code broadly aims to permit business reorganization, “it
does not permit anything and everything that might advance that
goal.”173
While Mission Product did not involve a dispute between franchisees,
its holding is of particular relevance in the franchise industry due to the
importance of intellectual property and the prevalence of license agree-
166. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
167. Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658–59.
168. Id. at 1661.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1661–63.
171. Id. at 1663 (first citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 15 (1924); then
citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018) (defining estate to include the “interests of the debtor in
property”)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1665–66 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S.
33, 51, (2008)).
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ments in relationships between franchisors and franchisees. Parties nego-
tiating license agreements may wish to clarify the effect of a licensor’s
bankruptcy on the rights of licensees to continue using intellectual prop-
erty governed by the agreement.
2. Enforcement
Whereas Mission Product presented an unsettled legal issue, Choice
Hotels International v. Gosla Family Trust174 involved a relatively
straightforward trademark infringement case—serving as yet another re-
minder that in the hotel industry, trademark protection is prime. In
Choice Hotels, the defendants operated a Comfort Suites hotel and Qual-
ity Suites pursuant to two franchise agreements with Choice Hotels Inter-
national, Inc. (Choice Hotels).175 After Choice Hotels terminated both
franchise agreements, it discovered that the defendants were continuing
to use the Quality and Comfort family of marks.176 Even after Choice
Hotels sent a cease and desist letter, defendants continued infringing by
“(1) using Quality Suites road and building signs, (2) answering the tele-
phone and saying, ‘Quality at Rittman,’ (3) and advertising the [hotel] on
several internet websites as either a Quality Suites hotel or a Comfort
Suites hotel.”177 Choice Hotels filed suit against the defendants in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for trademark in-
fringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act and
trademark and unfair competition under Texas common law.178 Choice
Hotels moved for summary judgment and the court, in a short opinion,
granted summary judgement to Choice Hotels as to liability and granted
a permanent injunction against defendants.179 The defendants’ use of the
exact marks and the particularly pressing nature of the industry, where a
bad experience could impact the entire franchise, was enough to establish
likelihood of confusion and irreparable injury in this case.180
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In a typical waiver-of-reliance clause, a franchisee acknowledges that,
other than representations set forth in the franchisor’s Franchise Disclo-
sure Document and franchise agreement, the franchisee did not rely on
any representations that may have been made in the franchise sales pro-
cess regarding specific subjects, most commonly financial performance
representations or guarantees of success. Texas courts have generally
been willing to enforce a properly drafted waiver-of-reliance clause that
174. No. SA-18-CV-00648-ADA, 2019 WL 4980461 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2019).
175. Id. at *1–2.
176. Id. at *2.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *8–9.
180. Id. at *4–5.
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expressly disclaims the alleged misstatements at issue. Results have not
been universal. A recent decision from the Texas Supreme Court appears
to close the door for good on certain fraud and fraudulent inducement
claims based on false representations that are contradicted by the parties’
franchise agreement. In Mercedes-Benz, LLC USA v. Carduco, Inc.,181
the Texas Supreme Court clarified that, under Texas law, a franchisee
may not justifiably rely on misrepresentations by the franchisor’s repre-
sentatives when such misrepresentations are contradicted by the express
terms of the franchise agreement.
In this case, Plaintiff Carduco alleged that Mercedes-Benz fraudulently
induced it into purchasing the assets of a Mercedes-Benz dealership in
Harlingen by making oral representations that Carduco could relocate its
dealership to McAllen and be the area’s exclusive dealer of Mercedes-
Benz vehicles.182 Carduco claimed that it repeatedly informed Mercedes-
Benz of its intentions to move to McAllen, and that Mercedes-Benz rep-
resentatives even went with Carduco to look for new locations in McAl-
len.183 At around the same time, Mercedes-Benz allegedly entered into
talks with another dealer to open up an exclusive dealership in the McAl-
len area without informing Carduco.184 Carduco’s agent entered into a
contract purchasing the assets of his son’s Harlingen dealership and a sep-
arate dealer agreement with Mercedes-Benz.185 The dealer agreement
limited Carduco’s right to operate to the dealership in Harlingen, Texas
and provided that Carduco did not have any exclusive rights to sell Mer-
cedes-Benz vehicles.186 After Mercedes-Benz announced that a different
dealer would be locating in McAllen and denied Carduco’s formal re-
quest to relocate to McAllen, Carduco filed suit, alleging that Mercedes-
Benz fraudulently induced it into entering into the dealer agreement.187
The jury awarded Carduco $15.3 million in actual damages and $115 mil-
lion in punitive damages. The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court
of Appeals upheld the judgment but reduced the punitive damages award
to $600,000.00.188 Both parties appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.189
To prevail on a fraud claim, actual and justifiable reliance must be
shown.190 Carduco argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into
the franchise agreement based on the franchisor’s representations that
Carduco could relocate to McAllen as the exclusive dealership in the re-
gion and that the franchisor had no plans to put another dealer in the
McAllen area.191 Mercedes-Benz argued that the clear language of the
181. 583 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2019).
182. Id. at 554.
183. Id. at 556.
184. Id. at 554.
185. Id. at 555.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 556.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 557.
190. Id. at 558.
191. Id. at 557.
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dealer agreement precluded reasonable reliance on pre-contractual rep-
resentations since the express terms conflict with the alleged
misrepresentations.192
In making its determination, the supreme court summarized its holding
in Orcha Assets, a recent case that found that direct contradiction, to-
gether with red flags and the party’s sophistication negated justifiable re-
liance.193 Carduco argued that the Orcha Assets analysis did not apply
because there were no “red flags.”194 The supreme court rejected
Carduco’s argument, finding that either direct contradiction or red flags
were sufficient to defeat justifiable reliance.195 The supreme court ex-
plained that “when a plaintiff asserts reliance on a misrepresentation that
the written contract directly and unambiguously contradicts, both are
present because the existence of such a conflict is itself a large red
flag.”196
Next, the supreme court rejected Carduco’s argument that Mercedes-
Benz had a duty to disclose because its representative made partial dis-
closures that triggered a duty to say more.197 The supreme court cited the
general rule that a failure to disclose is not fraud unless there is a duty to
disclose and that no duty of disclosure arises without a confidential or
fiduciary relationship.198 The supreme court also reiterated that the rela-
tionship between a franchisor and prospective franchises is not a special
or fiduciary relationship.199
Carduco argued the supreme court should adopt the court of appeals’
reasoning that Section 551 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that in arm’s-length transactions when “one makes a partial dis-
closure and conveys a false impression, he has the duty to speak.”200 The
supreme court, acknowledging that it had never expressly adopted Sec-
tion 551, determined that even if Section 551 applied, there was no fac-
tual basis for its application because Carduco conceded that no
representatives of Mercedes-Benz had made any affirmative disclosure
on the subject of relocating that could have triggered a legal duty to dis-
close more.201 Although Carduco attempted to show that there were ru-
mors that Mercedes-Benz would sell a new dealership in McAllen, this
rumor never reached Carduco’s decision makers.202
Finally, the supreme court cautioned that in an arm’s-length transac-
tion, the party alleging fraud must exercise ordinary care to protect its
192. Id.
193. Id. at 558 (citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546
S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2018)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 559.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 561–63.
198. Id. at 562.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 561.
201. Id. at 562–63.
202. Id. at 561–62.
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own interests and that justifiable reliance is based, in part, on the parties’
experience and bargaining power.203 Given that Carduco’s sole owner
was an experienced car dealer that understood the relationship between
manufacturers and authorized dealers, Carduco was required to exercise
greater diligence than the execution of a written contract that directly
contradicted Carduco’s assertions of fraudulent inducement.204 The su-
preme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and adjudged
that Carduco take nothing.205
Yesteryear Auto LLC v. Synergistic International LLC,206 also involved
typical waiver-of-reliance and merger clauses present in many franchise
agreements. In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas granted summary judgment for franchisor Synergistic Interna-
tional LLC d/b/a Glass Doctor based on waiver-of-reliance and merger
provisions in the franchise agreement. Interestingly, the district court de-
termined that there “was no boilerplate agreement” and commented that
franchisor and franchisee “were careful to address the issue of reliance”
at the time the franchise agreement was executed.207
Glass Door is a franchisor of businesses that install, repair, and replace
flat glass and auto glass.208 Plaintiffs entered into a franchise agreement
to operate a Glass Door franchise, but failed to pay the minimum license
fees and abandoned the franchise after about a year.209 Plaintiffs filed suit
against Glass Doctor, alleging breach of contract, fraud-based claims, and
violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).210 The claims
were based on franchisee’s contention that representatives of Glass Door
told Plaintiffs they could use a preexisting building on franchisee’s prop-
erty to house the franchise and that the location was approved in order to
induce Plaintiffs to enter into the franchise agreement.211 Plaintiffs also
contended that they were fraudulently induced into entering into the
franchise agreement by misrepresentations about the level of training and
projections related to success.
Glass Door successfully argued that these misrepresentations were ex-
pressly disclaimed and contradicted by the waiver-of-reliance clause in
the franchise agreement. For example, because Plaintiffs’ preexisting
building did not meet the specifications in the franchise agreement, the
district court determined that Plaintiffs could not have relied upon any
pre-contractual misrepresentation regarding approval of franchisee’s pre-
existing building.212
203. Id. at 563.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. No. 6:16-CV-00441-ADA-JCM, 2018 WL 7377942 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2018).
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As to franchisee’s claim for fraud and fraudulent inducement, the court
reviewed the terms of the franchise agreement and found that franchisee
failed to proffer any of the elements of a claim for fraud or fraudulent
inducement.213 The lack of evidence on any element of the fraud claim
coupled with the express language in the franchise agreement entitled
franchisor to summary judgment on the fraud claim.214 The court found
that the following, “[w]hile not entirely dispositive,” defeated the fraud
claim: (1) the waiver-of-reliance provision where franchisees acknowl-
edged that they were not relying on anything outside of the contract it-
self; (2) the fact that franchisees failed to list any specific representations
they relied upon when provided a place to do so in the franchise agree-
ment; and (3) the acknowledgment and representation by franchisees that
they fully understood and accepted all business risks described in the
franchise agreement.215
Turning to the fraudulent inducement claim, which requires that the
elements of fraud be established as they relate to an agreement between
the parties, the court also granted summary judgment to the franchisor
for the same reasons as the fraud claim.216 After rejecting franchisees’
efforts to toll the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment,
the court addressed the elements of the fraudulent concealment claim.
Again, the court found that franchisees failed to proffer evidence about
what specific acts of fraud they relied upon.217 All of the fraud-based
claims require actual and justifiable reliance, which the court determined
was defeated by the express waiver-of-reliance provision in the franchise
agreement.218
The court also determined that franchisees had failed to state a DTPA
claim because such a claim would require the court to ignore the express
language of the franchise agreement and rely on pre-contractual state-
ments that conflicted with the terms of the franchise agreement.219 In
addition, franchisees failed to state any specific information concerning
the franchise agreement that franchisor failed to disclose.
The court also determined that all of the claims were barred by the
parol evidence rule.220 Under the parol evidence rule, and absent fraud,
accident, or mistake, when parties reduce an agreement to writing, any
prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements are merged into the
final written agreement.221 Because the franchise agreement addressed
the purported pre-contractual representations and addressed training, the
right or ability to use Plaintiffs’ existing structure, and projections regard-
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ing success, the parol evidence rule barred the consideration of oral rep-
resentations concerning these topics.222 Finally, the district court
determined that Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of a breach of the
franchise agreement, since all of the purported breaches were allowed by
the franchise agreement.223
Waiver-of-reliance provisions have received significant attention in
both state and federal courts in Texas, as they have gained popularity in
franchise agreements. Because justifiable reliance is a necessary element
of fraud, these disclaimers are meant to preclude fraudulent inducement
and fraud claims. These disclaimers should be easier to enforce because
of Carduco and Yesteryear Auto. Whether the alleged misrepresentation
directly contradicts the express terms of a franchise agreement, however,
often depends on how the alleged misrepresentations are defined.
Most importantly, the lesson of Carduco is that franchisees cannot rely
upon oral representations made by the franchisor if such representations
conflict with the express terms of the franchise agreement. Thus,
franchisors, franchisees, and their counsel involved in franchising in Texas
should: (1) include all material representations in the terms of the
franchise agreement; and (2) include a “merger clause,” which supersedes
and negates all prior representations by the parties other than those in-
cluded in the franchise agreement itself.
B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Security Data Supply LLC v. Nortek Security and Control LLC,224
plaintiff Security Data Supply, LLC (SDS), a franchisor and wholesale
distributor of electronic security systems, and its franchisees (SDS Fran-
chisees) (SDS and SDS Franchisees, collectively, Plaintiffs), brought
claims for antitrust and price discrimination violations and tortious inter-
ference against defendants Nortek Security and Control (Nortek), Nortek
employee Earnest Bernard (Bernard), and Wave Electronics, Inc. (Wave)
(Nortek, Bernard, and Wave, collectively, Defendants).225 Nortek is a
manufacturer of electronic security systems and Wave is a wholesale dis-
tributor of electronic security systems that competes with SDS.226 SDS
claimed that while Bernard was employed at Nortek, Bernard provided
Wave with preferential pricing on Nortek 2GIG products.227 SDS further
alleged that Nortek sold identical products to SDS and Wave, but inten-
tionally discriminated against SDS in price through a rebate program,
which allowed Wave to sell Nortek 2GIG products at a lower price than
SDS could buy them.228 SDS alleged that Nortek management was aware
of this price discrimination scheme, and allowed it to continue after Ber-
222. Id. at *8.
223. Id.
224. No. 3:18-CV-1399-S, 2019 WL 3305628 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2019).
225. Id. at *1.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *2.
228. Id. at *1.
150 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
nard left Nortek.229 Plaintiffs alleged that they lost a significant number
of customers to Wave and were unable to compete for new customers.230
Plaintiffs sued Defendants for tortious interference with existing contract,
tortious interference with prospective business relations, and tortious in-
terference with existing business relations.231 Defendants moved to dis-
miss these causes of action for failure to state a claim.
As to the claim for tortious interference with existing contract, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted the motion to
dismiss because the complaint did not include any facts showing that De-
fendants induced any party to breach a contract, which is an essential
element of the claim.232 Plaintiffs were granted leave to plead additional
facts supporting the claim, however.233 As to the tortious interference
with prospective business relations, the district court considered whether
Plaintiffs pleaded business relationships that were beyond the negotia-
tions stage.234 To state a claim for tortious interference with prospective
business relations, a party must establish a reasonable probability that the
parties would have entered into a contractual relationship, which requires
“more than mere negotiations occurred.”235 In addition, a pre-existing
business relationship can be used to establish a reasonable probability of
prospective contractual relations.236 In this case, the cause of action was
adequately pleaded because Plaintiffs alleged two business relationships
beyond the negotiations stage, including its ongoing relationship with
Nortek.237 The district court also determined that Plaintiffs had ade-
quately pleaded an independently tortious act since Plaintiffs adequately
alleged a violation of antitrust laws.238
Similarly, the district court determined that the cause of action for tor-
tious interference with existing business relationships was adequately
pleaded. The district court determined that to the extent that Texas rec-
ognizes a claim for interference with an existing business relationship,
plaintiffs must show that the “interference was motivated by malice, but
do not need to allege the existence of a contract subject to interfer-
ence.”239 In this case, given the allegations of price discrimination and
bribery, which Defendants should have known were illegal, Plaintiffs had
229. Id. at *2.
230. Id.




235. Id. (quoting Richardson-Eagle, Inc v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 475
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)).
236. Id. (quoting Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Zeigler Chrysler Dodge Jeep-
Downers Grove, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-3310-B, 2017 WL 2729998, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 26,
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adequately pleaded malice.240 Finally, the court denied the motion to dis-
miss as to the civil conspiracy claim because Plaintiffs successfully
pleaded facts to support a civil conspiracy claim, including allegations
that Bernard and Wave conspired to engage in discriminatory pricing in
exchange for bribes and that Nortek and Wave jointly solicited Plaintiffs’
customers to switch to Wave.241
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. ANTITRUST
The Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) prohibits unlawful price discrimina-
tion. RPA cases generally arise when customers allege that a supplier has
charged them higher prices than their competitors. Despite numerous at-
tempts to repeal or modify it and refusal by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to enforce it, the RPA remains a reality for private litigants.
Although RPA claims do not generally arise in disputes between
franchisor and franchisees, it is possible for price discrimination claims to
be asserted by a franchisor and/or franchisee against a supplier. Such was
the case in Security Data Supply, discussed above.
Plaintiffs alleged that Nortek and Wave violated the RPA by “know-
ingly inducing, receiving, or engaging in price discrimination.”242 In addi-
tion, Plaintiffs alleged that Nortek, Wave, and Bernard had engaged in
commercial bribery in violation of Section 2(c) of the RPA.243 Plaintiffs
asserted that Bernard and other Nortek employees received gift cards as
bribes in exchange for giving Wave preferential pricing.244 Defendants
moved to dismiss the price discrimination claims asserted by the SDS
Franchisees for lack of standing and argued that the SDS Franchisees had
not suffered injury-in-fact or antitrust injury.245
The court noted that injury-in-fact is successfully shown by “pleading a
decline in sales because of the defendant’s conduct, but lacks standing if
no actual injury has yet occurred. . . .”246 The court rejected Defendants’
argument that injury-in-fact was not established for the purposes of sur-
viving a motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs alleged the loss of specific
clients and more than $9.5 million in revenue losses due to discriminatory
pricing.247 The court also determined that the SDS Franchisees suffered
antitrust injury.248 The court found that the RPA injury was a “secon-
dary-line case” involving price discrimination that injures competition
among the discriminating seller’s customers.249 Because the complaint
240. Id.
241. Id. at *10.
242. Id. at *3.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *2.
245. Id. at *3–4.
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had numerous allegations of the diversion of sales and profits from Plain-
tiffs to Wave, as well as allegations of discriminatory pricing that allowed
Wave to sell Nortek products well below the price Nortek charged Plain-
tiffs, Plaintiffs had properly pleaded antitrust injury.250
Finally, the court determined whether the SDS Franchisees were
proper plaintiffs to sue for antitrust injuries.251 Defendants argued that
the SDS Franchisees were not proper plaintiffs because they received
their inventory from franchisor SDS, and not directly from Defend-
ants.252 The court rejected Defendants’ argument that the SDS Franchis-
ees were indirect purchasers, noting that the indirect purchaser rule does
not apply in the “cost-plus” contract setting.253 Accepting the SDS Fran-
chisees’ allegations that any overcharge by Nortek is not absorbed by
franchisor, but instead passed directly through to the SDS Franchisees
through a standard mark-up, the court found that the SDS Franchisees
were proper plaintiffs because they alleged a cost-plus contract setting.254
The court next turned to the viability of the commercial bribery charge,
where Defendants argued that commercial bribery is not a violation of
RPA Section 2(c).255 The court explained that although the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not decided whether commercial bribery
is a violation of the RPA, every circuit that has addressed this issue has
found that commercial bribery is a violation.256 Having found that com-
mercial bribery is viable under RPA Section 2, the court next analyzed
the sufficiency of the allegations of commercial bribery as to Defend-
ants.257 The court determined that the allegations of commercial bribery
were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss as to Bernard, who is
alleged to have received bribes in the form of gift cards, and as to
Wave.258 The court found that the allegations as to Nortek’s direct liabil-
ity for commercial bribery failed to state a claim because the allegations
concede that Nortek did not consent to the bribery; however, vicarious
liability was properly pled.259
B. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
The automatic stay pending bankruptcy proceedings generally protects
only debtors. In limited circumstances, however, courts have extended
the stay to prevent non-debtor third-party collection efforts, such as law-
suits against guarantors of a debtor’s obligations. In addition, courts have
used their discretionary powers to stay proceedings. The issue of the im-
250. Id.
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pact of the automatic stay on non-debtor counter-defendants resulting
from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of some counter-defendants was dis-
cussed in Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC.260
Gigi’s Cupcakes’s franchisees counter-sued several franchise entities
and businesses.261 Four of the counter-defendants, including current
franchisor Gigi’s Cupcakes, filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy.262 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas then
stayed the case for ninety days to determine the effect of the bankruptcy
proceeding on the claims against the non-debtors.263 Three of the non-
debtors—FundCorp, Inc. (FundCorp), Food Business Services, LLC
(Food Business), and Gina Butler (Butler)—moved to extend the ninety-
day discretionary stay, which the franchisees opposed.264 FundCorp and
Food Business are commercial entities that do business with debtor and
franchisor Gigi’s Cupcakes.265 Franchisees alleged that FundCorp and
Food Business benefited from Gigi’s Cupcakes’s alleged fraudulent trans-
fers prior to bankruptcy.266 Franchisees generally asserted claims against
the non-debtors FundCorp and Food Business for state-law fraudulent
transfer, civil conspiracy, declaratory judgment, and violations of the
Texas Business Opportunity Act and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.267
Butler was one of the original founders of the Gigi’s Cupcakes
franchise (Prior Franchisor) but claimed that she no longer had any inter-
est in the franchises since transferring the franchise assets and interests,
including the franchise agreements, to debtor KeyCorp. KeyCorp is the
sole member of Gigi’s Cupcakes. Keycorp assigned its rights to purchase
the assets of the Prior Franchisor to Gigi’s Cupcakes.268 Franchisees as-
serted claims against Butler for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud and fraudulent transfer under state law, civil
conspiracy, and declaratory judgment.269
The district court noted that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) generally protects the debtor and does not apply to non-debt-
ors.270 The court explained that the stay can be extended to non-debtors
on rare occasions under Section 362(a) when the relationship between
the debtor and the non-debtor third party is such that a judgment against
260. No. 3:17-CV-3009-B, 2019 WL 1767003 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019) (mem. op.).
Haynes and Boone attorneys Deborah Coldwell, Iris Gibson, and Sally Dahlstrom re-
present Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC and certain of its affiliates in this matter.
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the non-debtor will be in effect a judgment against the debtor.271 The
district court noted that a second option was to exercise the court’s broad
discretion to stay proceedings in the interest of judgment.272 The court
addressed the extension of the stay as to FundCorp and Food Business,
and Butler separately.
Non-debtors FundCorp and Food Business argued that the state-law
fraudulent-transfer claims were subject to the automatic stay because
these claims sought recovery of estate property.273 The district court
agreed because the fraudulent-transfer claims alleged injuries derived
from harm done to Gigi’s Cupcakes, and thus belonged to the bankruptcy
estate.274 This was because the franchisees alleged that Gigi’s Cupcakes
was insolvent but made payments to non-debtors for less than “reasona-
bly equivalent value.”275 Although the franchisees argued that some of
the fraudulent-transfer claims were based on actual fraud that resulted in
particularized injury to the franchisees, the court determined that fran-
chisees failed to allege any specific conduct directed towards the franchis-
ees.276 Because the fraudulent-transfer claims were general and common
to all creditors, the court extended the automatic stay under Section
362(a)(3) since the fraudulent-transfer claims against FundCorp and
Food Business were property of the bankruptcy estate.277 Next, the court
extended the automatic stay to the three remaining claims against
FundCorp and Food Business under its discretionary stay powers because
these claims were “inextricably interwoven” with claims against the
debtor and because determining liability for the remaining claims would
require resolving factual and legal issues related to the debtor.278
The court, however, denied Butler’s request that the court stay the liti-
gation because the claims asserted against her were different from the
claims asserted against the other two non-debtors, FundCorp and Food
Business.279 While the claims against Butler arose mostly from her deal-
ings with franchisees before debtor acquired the assets of the Prior
Franchisor, the claims against FundCorp and Food Business arose after
the asset purchase.280 The fraud-based claims against Butler were gener-
ally based on alleged misrepresentations made prior to the execution of
the franchise agreements concerning the Prior Franchisor’s financial
health and solvency.281 Where Butler’s potential liability for fraud was
based on representations made prior to the execution of the franchise
271. Id. (citing Reliant Energy, 349 F.3d at 825).
272. Id. (citing Beran v. World Telemetry, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723 (S.D. Tex.
2010)).
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agreements, debtors’ liability was based on the debtors’ alleged notice of
Butler and the Prior Franchisor’s fraud.282 Nor could the court exercise
its discretionary power to extend the stay because Butler did not show
any hardship or judicial inefficiency that would result from allowing the
claims against her to move forward.283 Therefore, except for the conspir-
acy claim, which involved the stayed parties, the court denied Butler’s
request to extend the stay as to the claims against her.284 Finally, the
court ordered that franchisees could proceed against the three non-
debtor defendants who had yet to appear, as there was no reason to stay
these claims.285
Chapter 7 liquidation is a principal means used by franchises to dis-
charge their debts. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a broad discharge
with the intent to provide a fresh start to honest but unfortunate debtors.
Notwithstanding this broad discharge, Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code sets forth certain debts that are nondischargeable, including debts
obtained by actual fraud, embezzlement, and false representations.
Phelps v. Hunt (In re Hunt) involved the Chapter 7 individual bank-
ruptcy of the principal owner of a franchisor entity.286 Hunt was the
founder and principal owner of Tea 2 Go, LLC, which offered Tea 2 Go
franchises.287 Hunt told Phelps that the Tea 2 Go stores were grossing
$750,000.00 to $1,500,000.00 per year and provided projections for twelve
proposed territories.288 Between August 2014 and mid-to-late 2015,
Phelps acquired nine territories with exclusive rights to open Tea 2 Go
stores.289 In the spring of 2016, after many stores failed or never opened,
Phelps made an investment at Hunt’s request that did not involve the
purchase of additional franchises.290 Instead, for $55,000.00, Phelps ob-
tained from Hunt personally, a 49% interest in a company-owned Austin
store.291 Within a few weeks, Hunt sold the Austin store for $50,000.00
without Phelps’s knowledge.292 In April 2016, Hunt and his businesses
incurred a default judgment of over $598,000.00.293 After Hunt filed for
personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7, Phelps sought to liquidate his
fraud claims against Hunt for (1) the amounts paid for acquiring the
franchise rights from Tea 2 Go, LLC; and (2) the amount he paid Hunt
for the 49% interest in the Austin store and then have these fraud claims





286. Phelps v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 608 B.R. 477 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2019) (mem. op.).
287. Id. at 483.
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As to the amounts paid for acquiring the franchises from the
franchisor, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas
determined that Hunt could be personally liable for the fraud related to
the purchase of the franchise rights if Hunt’s conduct amounted to actual
fraud or if Hunt personally committed a fraudulent or intentionally tor-
tious act. Relying on its decision in Farooqi v. Carroll (In re Carroll),295
the bankruptcy court determined that if claims against the corporation
could be proven, personal liability against the debtor for the resultant
damages for his own tortious conduct would result if Hunt obtained funds
“by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”296
The court first considered whether Phelps satisfied his burden under
Section 532(a)(2)(A) to show that Hunt “made materially false state-
ments with the intent to deceive him that, in turn, induced his investment,
payment of franchise fees, or purchase of an interest in the LLC.”297
False or fraudulent statements concerning the debtor’s financial condition
are excluded under Section 523(a)(2)(A).298 As to the statements where
Hunt “touted the financial performance of the tea stores,” these repre-
sentations concerned the financial condition of Tea 2 Go (and Hunt) and
therefore fell outside Section 523(a)(2)(A).299 Although Tea 2 Go’s ac-
tions may be actionable, the court determined that Phelps did not meet
his burden to establish that the “payments for the franchises were solic-
ited through intentionally deceitful conduct by Hunt.”300 In addition, the
profit and loss statements fell short of “paint[ing] a substantially untruth-
ful picture” of Hunt’s financial condition. Therefore, Phelps failed to
meet his burden to prove that the claims should be nondischargeable
under Section 523(a)(2)(B), which prevents the discharge of debts ob-
tained by using written statements (here the profit and loss statements)
that are materially false.301 The district court highlighted the fact that
Phelps continued to invest after it became clear that there were problems
with the stores that he had previously purchased.302
Next, the court turned to whether Hunt’s sale of a 49% interest in the
Austin franchise to Phelps for $55,000.00 satisfied the elements of nondis-
chargeability under Sections 523(a)(4) and (a)(6). Section 523(a)(4) ex-
cepts from discharge debt arising from, among other acts, embezzlement
or larceny.303 Section 523(a)(6) provides that a “discharge under section
727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity.”304 Here, the court found that Phelps met his
295. 464 B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (mem. op.).
296. In re Hunt, 608 B.R. at 486.
297. Id. at 490.
298. Id. at 488.
299. Id. at 489–90.




304. Id. at 491 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2018)).
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burden to establish that Hunt intended to procure the $55,000.00 for his
own benefit.305 Given that Hunt was in “deep financial trouble” and the
fact that the Austin store was sold within a month without accounting to
Phelps, Phelps established embezzlement and willful misconduct under
Section 523(a)(4) and (a)(6).306
Filing an involuntary petition under 11 U.S.C. § 303 can be a good col-
lection tool for creditors. Under Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code,
creditors can file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under either Chap-
ter 7 or 11 against a debtor who has more than twelve creditors if they
meet certain criteria. Careful planning is required because, pursuant to
Section 303(i)(2) of the Code, if the court dismisses an involuntary peti-
tion after a determination that it was filed in bad faith, sanctions can be
imposed.
The issue of bad faith filing of an involuntary petition was considered
in In re Essential Financial Education, Inc., which involved an involuntary
petition filed against franchisee Essential Financial Education, Inc. (Es-
sential).307 Sophisticated investor Thomas Caufield (Caufield) formed Es-
sential and operated an online financial management investment
company pursuant to a franchise agreement with franchisor OTA
Franchise Corporation (OTA).308 After Caufield and Essential violated
the franchise agreement by improperly soliciting investments, OTA per-
mitted franchisee to sell the business in lieu of termination and subject to
the franchisee’s payment of several large debts owed to franchisor and
others.309 Gary Flick (Flick), an investor in Essential, claimed he did not
receive the promised return on his investment and sued Essential for se-
curities violations and fraud.310 Essential and Flick entered into a pro-
posed final judgment where Essential and Caufield agreed to repay
Flick.311 Before the judgment was approved, however, Flick filed an in-
voluntary petition of bankruptcy against Essential, which Essential did
not protest.312 OTA sought dismissal or abstention of the involuntary
bankruptcy petition.313
First, Flick argued that OTA did not have standing because it was not a
creditor with claims against the estate. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas disagreed with Flick and determined that OTA
was a creditor of the estate because it had claims against Essential under
the franchise agreement for indemnification and attorney’s fees relating
305. Id. at 492.
306. Id.
307. In re Essential Fin. Educ., Inc., No. 18-33108-BJH, 2019 WL 1750906 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Apr. 16, 2019). Haynes and Boone attorneys Deborah Coldwell and Sally Dahlstrom
represented OTA in this matter.
308. Id. at *1.
309. Id.




158 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
to the settlement and involuntary petition.314
Next, OTA argued that Essential’s involuntary petition should be dis-
missed because Flick did not hold a claim against Essential, the petition
was nothing more than an extension of prebankruptcy litigation between
Essential and Flick, and the equities favored dismissal.315 The bankruptcy
court disagreed.
First, the bankruptcy court found that Flick had a claim against Essen-
tial, as evidenced by the pre-petition schedules filed by Essential that
listed Flick as an unsecured creditor in an amount of the proposed final
judgment.316 Furthermore, the court found there were no facts to suggest
collusion between Essential and Flick.317 Second, the court determined
that the bankruptcy case was not a mere extension of prebankruptcy liti-
gation because the claims against the estate listed in Essential’s schedules
were presumptively valid.318 Third, the bankruptcy court held that the
bad faith necessary to support dismissal of an involuntary case requires
that a petitioning creditor “acted with wrongful motives, wrongful objec-
tives or both.”319 Further, many courts have adopted a presumption that
a petitioning creditor “acted in good faith” in filing an involuntary peti-
tion. The fact that Flick sent a pre-petition demand letter to OTA threat-
ening to file the involuntary petition unless he was paid was aggressive,
but standing alone did not support a finding that the involuntary petition
was filed in bad faith or solely as a litigation tactic.320 Finally, after weigh-
ing the seven abstention factors to determine whether abstention should
be granted in the court’s discretion, the court concluded that the involun-
tary petition should proceed in federal bankruptcy court and denied
OTA’s abstention request.321
Using an involuntary petition for an improper purpose, such as at-
tempting to gain advantage in a pre-petition litigation, may result in sanc-
tions. If like in Essential, however, the petitioning creditors meet the
threshold criteria and the debtor is not generally paying its debts as they
become due, the bankruptcy case will proceed just as if a voluntary peti-
tion had been filed.
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
In the franchise and distribution context, Texas courts continue to per-
mit a business owner’s ability to provide lay witness opinion regarding
lost profits and other damages. In the proper context, this avenue to es-
314. Id. at *3.
315. Id. at *4.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at *5.
319. Id. (citing Aigner v. McMillan, No. 11-47029-DML-7, 2013 WL 2445042, at *4
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 4, 2013) (mem. op.)).
320. Id.
321. Id. at *6–7.
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tablish damages can alleviate the need for costly experts or mollify strate-
gic mistakes regarding designation of experts. In Servicios Comerciales
Lamosa, S.A. de C.V. v. De la Rosa, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas examined a manufacturers’ motion to exclude lay
opinion testimony from a distributor’s owner regarding lost profits.322
Two manufacturers of ceramic tile filed contract claims against their
Texas-based distributor, Mundo Tile, and its owner, De la Rosa, seeking
approximately $3 million in unpaid amounts under promissory notes and
a personal guaranty.323 Mundo Tile and De la Rosa filed numerous coun-
terclaims, including a contract claim for breach of an alleged exclusive
distribution arrangement.324
After denying various motions for summary judgment, the district
court turned to the manufacturers’ motion to exclude expert and lay
opinion testimony from De la Rosa regarding lost profits and other dam-
ages.325 The manufacturers first argued Mundo Tile had not timely desig-
nated its owner as an expert, but Mundo Tile noted that De la Rosa
would only be offering lay opinion testimony.326 While the manufacturers
argued De la Rosa’s testimony should be struck because it would not
constitute “competent evidence with reasonable certainty,” the district
court reiterated that Rule 701 of the Federal Rule of Evidence has long
recognized that a business owner could testify to the “value or projected
profit[ ]” of his business without qualifying as an expert in accounting,
appraisals, or other forms of valuation—so long as the owner had suffi-
cient personal knowledge of the business and financials.327
Because De la Rosa was the founder, sole operator, and owner of
Mundo Tile for more than fourteen years, the district court concluded he
had sufficient knowledge of his company’s financials to testify about lost
profits under Rule 701.328 The manufacturers’ objections to De la Rosa
concerned the weight of his testimony, as opposed to admissibility, which
could be tested during cross examination or through rebuttal testi-
mony.329 Accordingly, the court denied the motion to exclude De la
Rosa’s lay opinion testimony.330 This case serves as a useful reminder that
you do not always need a paid expert to establish damages in a breach of
contract claim so long as the business owner has sufficient information
about his company’s financials. There may be instances, however, where
cross examination could be detrimental or an owner’s testimony may
need to be bolstered or supplemented by a retained expert.
322. Servicios Comerciales Lamosa, S.A. de C.V. v. De la Rosa, 328 F. Supp. 3d 598
(N.D. Tex. 2018) (mem. op.).
323. Id. at 604–05.
324. Id. at 605.
325. Id. at 610–15.
326. Id. at 615, 617.
327. Id. at 615, 617–18.
328. Id. at 618.
329. Id. at 618–19.
330. Id. at 618.
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B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The dispute in All Tech Repairs, Inc. v. MMI-CPR, LLC331 concerned
an Area Representative Agreement (ARA) related to retail stores for
cell phones and other electronic devices.332 There were three plaintiffs:
(1) All Tech Repairs, Inc. (All Tech), the “Area Developer”; (2) Mobile
Solutions, Inc. (MSI), a franchisee of defendant-franchisor MMI-CPR,
LLC (CPR); and (3) Mobile Solutions One, Inc. (MSO), the operating
company for MSI’s stores (collectively, the Plaintiffs).333 CPR notified
All Tech that it was terminating the ARA—a contract only between CPR
and All Tech—due to All Tech’s alleged failure to develop a number of
stores and to support franchisees.334 Plaintiffs sought a declaration that
the termination notice was invalid because there was no opportunity to
cure, alleged CPR breached the ARA by failing to pay royalty fees to All
Tech, and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin CPR from terminating the ARA.335
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas first ex-
amined the immediate and irreparable harm elements necessary for in-
junctive relief.336 While Plaintiffs claimed lost income, lost customers,
and financial distress constituted their irreparable harm, the court noted
those would only be “irreparable” if they could not be measured in
money damages or if they demonstrated a substantial threat to their exis-
tence.337 Because Plaintiffs offered only conclusory statements to demon-
strate the alleged harms could not be measured in money damages, the
court focused exclusively on whether a potential threat to the Plaintiffs’
existence existed.338
To that end, the court concluded Plaintiffs could not meet their burden
on this issue because they delayed seeking injunctive relief for sixteen
days after the case was removed to federal court.339 Plaintiffs defended
their delay by explaining they were engaged in good-faith negotiations
with opposing counsel to avoid litigation.340 While the court gave Plain-
tiffs some benefit for trying to negotiate a solution with CPR, it empha-
sized that Plaintiffs took no steps to protect themselves from the loss of
future royalties during those negotiations—which constituted the alleged
substantial threat to their existence.341 Plaintiffs’ actions therefore under-
331. No. 3:19-CV-1051-K, 2019 WL 2286082 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2019) (mem. op.).
332. Id. at *1.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that CPR had breached the ARA in three different ways,
including the failure to pay royalties to All Tech. Id.
336. Id. at *2.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. The court also noted that the dispute over the ARA first arose in January 2019,
yet Plaintiffs did not seek any injunctive relief in state court until April 17, 2019, prior to
the case being removed to federal court. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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mined the “urgency” of their requested injunctive relief.342
Further, the court determined that the irreparable nature of the harm
felt by Plaintiffs was due in part to their operating structure—not as a
result of any alleged breach of the contract by CPR.343 While the Plain-
tiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive relief and their operating structure may
not have been fatal to their request for injunctive relief if taken sepa-
rately, the court concluded that they undermined any proof that Plaintiffs
proved irreparable or imminent harm when considered together.344
This case demonstrates that franchises must ensure they take swift
steps to protect against any irreparable harm even if they attempt good-
faith negotiations to avoid litigation in a cost-effective and efficient man-
ner. Otherwise, a court can make an easy inference that allegations of a
“immediate” harm are unwarranted. Further, when alleging irreparable
harm, it is critical to tie that irreparability to the basis for the lawsuit,
such as allegations of breach by the other party rather than harm result-
ing from their own business decisions.
The dispute in South Plains Sno, Inc. v. Eskimo Hut Worldwide, Ltd.
concerned alcoholic frozen drinks that were sold as a to-go item in Lub-
bock, Texas.345 South Plains Sno, Inc. (South Plains), the franchisee, filed
suit alleging Eskimo Hut Worldwide, Ltd. (Eskimo), the franchisor,
breached the franchise agreement. Eskimo filed counterclaims also as-
serting breach and sought a temporary injunction to stop the franchisee
from selling the products.346 The temporary injunction was granted by the
251st District Court of Randall County, Texas, and South Plains filed an
interlocutory appeal of that decision.347
The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals first described the recipes for
the frozen drinks at issue.348 Eskimo provided recipes to South Plains for
mixing the “base mix,” which was combined with water, the customer’s
selected flavor, and wine or other alcoholic beverages.349 Eskimo did not
supply the alcohol or require its franchisees to purchase a particular type
of alcohol, and a franchisee determined what, if any, amount of alcohol to
add to the drink mix.350 Eskimo asserted that South Plains violated the
franchise agreement because it did not follow the base mix and flavors for
the drinks, something South Plains did not dispute.351
South Plains argued Eskimo could not have any probable right of re-
covery because the provisions of the franchise agreement related to the
342. Id.
343. Id. at *3.
344. Id.
345. S. Plains Sno, Inc. v. Eskimo Hut Worldwide, Ltd., No. 07-19-00003-CV, 2019 WL
1591994 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 12, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
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addition of alcohol was illegal and unenforceable.352 Specifically, South
Plains relied on an excerpt from the Texas Alcohol Beverage Code that
required every alcohol permittee (like South Plains) to have exclusive
control over every phase of the sale of alcoholic beverages—and any de-
vice, scheme, or plan that surrenders control was unlawful.353 According
to the court, South Plains did not cite to any case that supported the argu-
ment that, by dictating the recipe of the base mix, Eskimo concocted any
scheme that forced South Plains to surrender control in violation of the
alcohol code.354 Without any persuasive evidence of illegality, the court
found no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirmed its grant of
the temporary injunction.355
In a separate part of the opinion, the appellate court examined whether
a provision of a franchise agreement regarding extraordinary relief,
standing alone, could authorize a court to grant injunctive relief irrespec-
tive of the elements for such relief under Texas law.356 Neither the parties
nor the court could find any such authority.357 The court recognized,
however, that the mere existence of the provision provided at least some
evidence that South Plains agreed that failing to comply with uniform
standards for the drinks would produce incalculable and irreparable dam-
age sufficient for extraordinary relief.358 Coupled with testimony from
Eskimo that South Plains’ actions jeopardized the consistency of Es-
kimo’s product, the appellate court concluded there was enough evidence
for the trial court to have found some evidence of imminent injury and
irreparable harm.359
An important takeaway from this case is that franchisors should be
cognizant of the restrictions in the Texas Alcohol Beverage Code if the
franchise agreement concerns recipes for alcoholic beverages. Further,
while most franchise agreements include an extraordinary relief provision
like the one in this case, that provision standing alone may not necessarily
be sufficient to meet the requirements for injunctive relief under Texas
law.
352. Id. at *4.
353. Id. (relying on TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 109.53).
354. Id.
355. Id. at *5.
356. Id. The relevant provision provided:
It is specifically understood and agreed that Eskimo Hut Worldwide will in-
cur incalculable and irreparable damage from any violation of sections . . .
7.A . . . of this Agreement . . . and that Eskimo Hut Worldwide has no ade-
quate remedy at law and is entitled to injunctive relief, including specific
performance, for any such action or threatened violation. All remedies con-
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C. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
OsteoStrong Franchising, LLC v. Richter concerned a trademark in-
fringement case filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico that was identical to a case originally filed in U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas before the franchisor voluntarily dis-
missed the first case in the face of a motion to dismiss due to lack of
personal jurisdiction.360 In the second case, the franchisees sought costs
and fees incurred in defending the first dismissed action under Rule 41(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.361 While the franchisor argued
there was no vexatious intent to justify any award of costs and fees, the
court expressed doubt whether such intent was required under Rule
41(d).362 Even assuming such intent was not required, however, the court
declined to impose costs in favor of the franchisees because: (1) the
franchisor had a good-faith basis to believe the Texas court had personal
jurisdiction; (2) its voluntary dismissal was prompted by the franchisees
rather than an exercise of forum-shopping by the franchisor; and (3) the
Texas case was dismissed at an early stage of the litigation.363
This case is instructive for parties who voluntarily dismiss claims in one
federal court and refile identical claims in federal court in a different
state. If too much time elapses, there was no good-faith basis for filing in
the first court, or if the second court determines the re-filing was due to
forum-shopping, then costs could be imposed on the plaintiff at the outset
of the second litigation.
In Stockade Franchising, LP v. Kelly Restaurant Group, LLC, a
franchisor sought to recover attorney’s fees incurred in confirming an
award issued by an arbitrator in its favor due to the franchisees’ breach of
franchising agreements and intellectual property violations.364 While the
arbitrator had awarded damages to the franchisor plus attorney’s fees and
expenses,365 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas,
Austin, noted at the outset that the award clearly stated: “All claims for
relief sought by any of the parties that are not expressly awarded are
hereby denied.”366 Further, the district court had not earlier awarded at-
torney’s fees when it confirmed the award.367
360. OsteoStrong Franchising, LLC v. Richter, No. 18-1184 WJ/JFR, 2019 WL 3007062
(D.N.M. July 10, 2019) (mem. op.). While this case was ultimately decided in New Mexico
federal court, it began in Texas federal court and provides analysis that could be relevant
for parties seeking to file in Texas federal court after voluntarily dismissing a prior action
in a different state’s federal court. See OsteoStrong Franchising, LLC v. Richter, No. 4:17-
CV-03746 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2018).
361. OsteoStrong Franchising, 2019 WL 3007062, at *1.
362. Id. at *2.
363. Id. at *3–4.
364. Stockade Franchising, LP v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 1:18-CV-918-RP, 2019 WL
5773699 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019).
365. Id. at *1 (referencing pages 1–3 of the arbitration award).
366. Id. (quoting page 4 of the arbitration award).
367. Id. at *2.
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Notwithstanding the language of the arbitration award and the district
court’s confirmation, the franchisor argued it was entitled to attorney’s
fees in costs for confirming the award based on the parties’ franchising
agreements.368 The district court rejected this argument because the
terms of the provision at issue only authorized fees “based entirely or in
part on the terms” of the agreements, which was not at issue since the
franchisor was actually seeking fees to enforce the arbitration award.369
Well-established case law restricted a trial court from awarding additional
attorney’s fees to enforce or appeal a confirmation unless the arbitration
agreement provided otherwise, which the agreement did not do in this
case.370 Without any basis in the franchising agreement to entitle the
franchisor to fees and costs for confirming the arbitration award, the
court denied the franchisor’s motion for additional fees.371 While con-
firming arbitration awards invariably require costs and expenses, if
franchise clients want the ability to recover those fees they must expressly
include the ability to recover such fees in their franchising agreements.
After the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas,
granted a franchisor’s motion for summary judgment on a franchisee’s
claims in Pizza Inn Inc. v. Clairday, the parties proceeded to trial on the
parties’ competing declaratory judgment actions.372 The jury found in
favor of the franchisee and awarded $250,000.00. The franchisee then
moved for costs and attorney’s fees under Rule 54(d).373 The franchisor
objected to the amounts and recovery of both under the Federal Rules,
and the district court examined each item in the franchisee’s bill of costs
and motion for attorney’s fees.374
First, the district court sustained the franchisor’s objection to the
amount of court costs related to expert expenses and reduced the amount
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1920.375 The court noted that unless an expert is
court-appointed, the statute limits the court to taxing a maximum of
$40.00 per day for an expert witness’s attendance plus reasonable travel
expenses.376 Accordingly, the court limited the amounts related to expert
witnesses to $40.00 per day for attendance plus just under $900.00 for
reasonable travel expenses.377
Second, with respect to attorney’s fees, the court observed that a party
can recover attorney’s fees so long as it is entitled to them—even if the
368. Id. The court noted in a footnote that the franchisor did not argue for fees and
costs on any other basis. Id. at *2 n.2.
369. Id. at *2.
370. Id. at *3.
371. Id. at *3–4.
372. Pizza Inn Inc. v. Clairday, No. 3:18-CV-0221-N, 2019 WL 5739296, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2019) (mem. op.).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at *1–2. The franchisor did not object to reimbursement for court filing fees or
the costs of two deposition transcripts, and the court awarded these amounts since they
were reasonable and within the limits of the statute. Id. at *2.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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party did not specifically request such fees—so long as its adversary is put
on notice such fees are at issue.378 While presentment of such fees can be
made orally or in writing, the court reiterated that merely filing a lawsuit
does not suffice.379 Since the franchisee’s pleading included a general re-
quest for attorney’s fees, the court found sufficient evidence of present-
ment, especially in light of a provision in the parties’ franchise agreement
that authorized a prevailing party to move for such fees after liability had
been determined.380 The franchisor also argued that the franchisee had
failed to segregate its fees between the claims it succeeded on and those it
did not, but the court concluded the franchisee had properly segregated
its fees. While some fees were incurred for successful and unsuccessful
claims, the court determined segregation was not required since the attor-
neys’ work was so intertwined within those claims.381
It should be noted that while the burden to present attorney’s fees is
relatively small, a party seeking fees must still ensure it provides suffi-
cient notice under federal law. Further, during the evolution of litigation,
a party must take care to segregate fees among all its claims in the event
that it prevails only on some claims. Franchise lawyers should also be
conscious of the statutory limits for expert witnesses under federal law, so
a client does not have to absorb some of those costs even if it prevails at
trial and on its motion for fees and costs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Survey period witnessed the Texas courts continuing to define pro-
cedural and substantive issues in the franchising context.
Among the procedural cases, Victor Elias Photography, LLC empha-
sized the important nuances for personal jurisdiction in our digital era, as
well as the importance of corporate formalities when assessing general
jurisdiction. Amazing Lash Franchise demonstrates the importance of the
exception to the general rule that legal rights may be assigned using the
ubiquitous “claims or causes of action” catchall, which can affect parties’
constitutional standing to bring a lawsuit. And Dickey’s Barbecue Restau-
rants showed that arbitration provisions and awards continued to see sup-
port from Texas courts.
Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Pecos Inn demonstrates the lengths
courts will go to grant parties relief from default judgements. In that case,
the court set aside the default judgment. The court emphasized the judi-
cial policy favoring a full and fair hearing that weighs decisively against
the resolution of litigation by a default judgment.
This Survey’s analysis of common law claims included cases addressing
fraud and misrepresentation.
378. Id.
379. Id. at *3.
380. Id. at *3–4.
381. Id. at *4.
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Most notably, waiver-of-reliance provisions were addressed in both
state and federal courts in Texas. Because justifiable reliance is a neces-
sary element of fraud, these disclaimers, which are commonplace in
franchise agreements, are meant to preclude fraudulent inducement and
fraud claims. In Carduco, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that, under
Texas law, a franchisee may not justifiably rely on misrepresentations by
the franchisor’s representatives when such misrepresentations are contra-
dicted by the express terms of the franchise agreement. Likewise, in Yes-
teryear Auto, the federal district court granted summary judgment for the
franchisor based on waiver-of-reliance and merger provisions in the
franchise agreement. Disclaimers should be easier to enforce because of
Carduco and Yesteryear Auto. It is important to note, however, that
whether the alleged misrepresentation directly contradicts the express
terms of a franchise agreement often depends on how the alleged misrep-
resentations are defined.
Finally, among the remedy cases, Servicios Comerciales Lamosa, S.A.
de C.V. v. De la Rosa demonstrated that Texas courts continue to permit
a business owner’s ability to provide lay witness opinion regarding lost
profits and other damages in the franchise and distribution context. In
this case, the court denied the manufacturer’s motion to exclude lay opin-
ion testimony from a distributor’s owner regarding lost profits. All Tech
Repairs serves as a reminder to take immediate action to protect against
any irreparable harm even if there is an attempt for good-faith negotia-
tions to avoid litigation in a cost-effective and efficient manner. Other-
wise, a court can make an easy inference that allegations of “immediate”
harm are unwarranted. Further, when alleging irreparable harm, it is criti-
cal to tie that irreparability to the basis for the lawsuit, such as allegations
of breach by the other party rather than harm resulting from their own
business decisions.
Taken together, the cases analyzed in this Survey provide a recent ac-
count of the most prominent changes occurring in the field of franchise
law in Texas. These cases illustrate continuing trends in franchise law ju-
risprudence and draw attention to emergent legal issues which franchise
law practitioners should continue to monitor in the months and years
ahead.
